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The trial of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North in the spring of 1989
focused Congress' attention on an aspect of the Iran-Contra affair which
had previously received scant attention: the Reagan administration's ef-
forts to persuade foreign governments to assist the Nicaraguan Contras
while United States aid to the Contras was barred. Attempts in Congress
the following fall to enact legislation prohibiting such foreign fundraising
have raised the question of whether Congress has the constitutional power
to stop the executive from engaging in what has been termed "tin cup"
diplomacy.1
This Note argues that whenever Congress bars aid to a foreign govern-
ment or cause, it may broadly prohibit quid pro quo arrangements which
reward third countries for providing assistance to that government or
cause. This Note maintains, however, that Congress lacks the constitu-
tional power to prevent solicitations, whereby the executive simply urges
foreign governments to provide funds directly to the prohibited cause.'
Congress could nevertheless exercise significant control over solicitations,
and could attempt to bring all foreign fundraising issues into the normal
budget process, by enacting a measure requiring the executive to report all
fundraising activity to Congress.
Section I describes the practice of foreign fundraising in the context of
the Iran-Contra affair, and subsequent efforts to enact legislative controls.
Section II argues that Congress has the power to prohibit quid pro quo
arrangements. Section III argues that Congress could not enact an effec-
1. Then-Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams coined the expression in testimony to Con-
gress, Washington Post, June 4, 1987, at A18, col. 1 ("I think it is shameful for the United States to
be going around rattling a tin cup . . ."), and subsequent commentators have adopted the phrase,
see, e.g., HOUSE SELECT COMM. TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN AND
SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE NICARAGUAN OPPO-
SITION, REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMS. INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, S.
REP. No. 216, H.R. REP. No. 433, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 391 (1987) [hereinafter IRAN-CONTRA
REPORT].
2. The precise definition of quid pro quos has been an issue. The narrowest definition requires an
explicit agreement with another government to provide aid in return for U.S. assistance, while the
broadest includes any funds provided to another government as a reward for providing aid. See infra
notes 23-29 and accompanying text. Solicitations, as defined in this Note, may include promises of
non-monetary rewards to the solicited country, such as a pledge by executive branch officials to urge
Congress to increase future levels of aid. This Note assumes that Congress has the power to prohibit
executive branch officials from exercising control over funds solicited from foreign governments. See,
e.g., IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 1, at 16 ("The Constitutional plan. . . .does prohibit such
solicitation where the United States exercises control over their receipt and expenditure.").
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tive ban on solicitations without infringing on the executive's ability to
conduct diplomacy. Finally, Section IV offers a legislative proposal to con-
trol both quid pro quos and solicitations.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Practice of Foreign Fundraising
From 1983 until 1986, Congress enacted a series of measures called the
Boland amendments restricting United States aid to the Nicaraguan Con-
tras. The strictest of these measures applied during fiscal year 1985 and
appeared to terminate all forms of United States assistance to the Con-
tras.' The report of the Iran-Contra committees of Congress describes
how the administration responded almost immediately to the Boland
amendments by seeking alternative sources of funding from both private
citizens and foreign governments.' The congressional investigation uncov-
ered evidence of numerous foreign solicitations, including one of Saudi
Arabia which resulted in the largest contribution to the Contras, a total of
$32 million over two years."
Despite this evidence, the Iran-Contra report discusses only some of the
legal issues raised by foreign fundraising.6 The majority report concludes
3. The act stated that:
During fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Depart-
ment of Defense, or any agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities
may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting,
directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group,
organization, movement, or individual.
Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 8066, 98 Stat. 1837, 1935. For a history of all of the
various Boland amendments, see 133 CONG. REc. H4584-4987 (daily ed. June 15, 1987).
4. See IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 1, at 37-38. Robert McFarlane testified that the Pres-
ident directed the National Security Council staff to keep the Contras together "body and soul." Id. at
37. Even while the amendments were in place, there were widespread suspicions that the administra-
tion was engaging in alternative fundraising efforts, but repeated inquiries from Congress were met
with denials from administration officials. Id. at 4-5; Washington Post, May 19, 1984, at Al, col. 1.
In the summer of 1985, Congress passed the "Pell amendment" prohibiting the United States from
conditioning, "expressly or impliedly," aid to foreign governments on assistance to the Contras. Inter-
national Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-83, § 722(d), 99 Stat.
149; see also 133 CONG. REC. H4834-39, H4972-73 (daily ed. June 15, 1987) (legislative history).
5. IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 1, at 38-39, 42, 44-45, 63 (describing solicitations of
Israel, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, China, South Korea, and Taiwan). The report suggests that Presi-
dent Reagan participated to some degree in the Saudi solicitation. Id. at 45. Shortly after the Saudis
began providing aid to the Contras, President Reagan invoked an emergency procedure to bypass
Congress and sell the Saudis 400 Stinger missiles. L.A. Times, May 17, 1987, pt. 1, at 1, col. 5.
Altogether, the Iran-Contra report uncovered evidence of $34 million raised for the Contras from
abroad. IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
Although the congressional committees found no evidence that the solicitations took the form of
quid pro quo arrangements, in their final report they cited Richard Secord's testimony that "where
there is a quid, there is a quo," id. at 15, and noted that successful solicitations create pressures on the
United States government to reward the contributing country. Id. Thus any solicitation, if not in the
form of a quid pro quo arrangement to begin with, may turn into one over time.
6. Rather than focusing on policy issues, the congressional committees tended to concentrate on
questions of individual guilt. See H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 16 (1990).
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that the Constitution forbids executive branch officials from exercising
control over any solicited funds, but that it does not prohibit the President
from asking foreign governments to contribute funds directly.7 The major-
ity report fails to address, however, the possibility of statutory controls on
solicitations and quid pro quo arrangements. The minority report, in con-
trast, does touch on the statutory issue, and argues that Congress does not
have the constitutional power to prohibit the President from asking other
countries to make direct contributions.'
New information revealed during the North trial prompted Congress to
revisit the issue of foreign fundraising. A stipulation of facts entered into
evidence suggested that at least ten countries were asked to assist the Con-
tras,' and that several-Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and possibly
El Salvador-were then rewarded with increased U.S. assistance.1" Fur-
thermore, previously undisclosed documents detailed the planning and ap-
proval of the quid pro quo arrangement with Honduras." Together, the
stipulation and the documents showed that high-level officials in the ad-
ministration carefully planned the Honduras arrangement, 2 secured Pres-
ident Reagan's approval, 3 and insured that the conditions would not be
7. IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 1, at 16, 18.
8. Id. at 451 (minority report).
9. Stipulation of Facts, United States v. North (D.D.C. Apr. 6, 1989) (No. 88-0080-02) [herein-
after Stipulation] (Israel, Saudi Arabia, Honduras, Costa Rica, Taiwan, South Korea, China, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Panama) (copy on file with author).
10. Id. at 16, 19-27; see also Washington Post, Apr. 7, 1989, at Al, col. 3 (describing stipula-
tion). Michael Kozak, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, later told Con-
gress that the stipulation was "misleading" in that it failed to disclose that State Department opposi-
tion had killed the idea of a quid pro quo with Honduras. N.Y. Times, Apr. 26, 1989, at A19, col. 1.
Kozak later sent a clarifying letter to Congress, however, stating that although the State Department
had opposed the plan, he could not state that it had not been carried out. N.Y. Times, June 4, 1989,
§1, at 30, col. 3. But see N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1989, § 1, at 26, col. 4 (arguing that stipulation
misleadingly suggests that high-level officials approved quid pro quo with Guatemala).
11. Defense Exhibit 54, United States v. North (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 1989) (No. 88-0080-02) (here-
inafter Exhibit 541 (copy on file with author); see also L.A. Times, Apr. 16, 1989, pt. 1, at 1, col. 4
(describing Honduras documents).
12. The stipulation describes a February 7, 1985 meeting of the Crisis Pre-Planning Group
(CPPG) with high-level representatives from the National Security Council, State and Defense De-
partments, Central Intelligence Agency, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. Stipulation, supra note 9, at 20.
According to a February 11 memo, contained in the North exhibit, from North and Raymond Burg-
hardt (National Security Council Staff) to National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane, the CPPG
agreed to a quid pro quo arrangement with Honduras. Exhibit 54, supra note 11. The memo notes
that the meeting was followed by several days of negotiations on specifics. Id. The North exhibit then
includes a February 12 memo from McFarlane to Secretaries George Shultz (State) and Caspar
Weinberger (Defense), Director William Casey (Central Intelligence), and General John Vessey
(Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff) detailing the proposal and requesting approval. A February 15
memo from North and Burghardt to McFarlane notes that the State Department subsequently raised
objections to sending a special emissary to Honduras, and to making increased U.S. aid conditional on
aid to the Contras. Id. Despite these objections, the plan was approved by the President, and appears
to have been implemented. See infra note 13.
A February 7, 1985 memo signed by Secretary of State Schultz and released in conjunction with the
Poindexter trial confirms that Schultz was personally aware of the CPPG proposal. See Washington
Po t, Dec. 16, 1989, at Al, col. 5.
13. February 19, 1985 memo from McFarlane approved by the President describing the quid pro
quo arrangement with Honduras. Exhibit 54, supra note 11. The approved plan called for a very
general letter of support from President Reagan to President Suazo, followed by the dispatch of an
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transmitted to Honduras in written form. 4 The trial further disclosed
that several months after the quid pro quo was implemented, National
Security Adviser Robert McFarlane wrote a memo to President Reagan to
prepare him for a meeting with President Suazo of Honduras. McFarlane
suggested that "[w]ithout making the linkage too explicit, it would be use-
ful to remind Suazo that in return for our help-in the form of security
assurances as well as aid-we do expect cooperation in pursuit of our
mutual objectives."' 5
In the past, Congress has acquiesced to both covert and overt foreign
fundraising efforts. The Iran-Contra solicitations and quid pro quos re-
present, therefore, an unauthorized version of a familiar, though hardly
common, diplomatic program. Over the past two decades, for example, the
U.S. has reportedly enlisted the help of the Saudis, with the knowledge of
the Intelligence Committees of Congress, for a variety of America" covert
operations.' 6 Former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski has
written that at one meeting with the Saudis "[w]e agreed in principle that
the United States would look more favorably on additional Saudi arms
purchase proposals and that in return we would expect greater Saudi as-
sistance both for the Afghans, especially the refugees, and for the Pakis-
tanis."" Overtly, the U.S. has urged Japan and Western Europe to pro-
emissary who would "proceed to Honduras carrying the signed copy of [Reagan's] letter and.., very
privately explain our criteria for the expedited economic support, security assistance deliveries, and
enhanced CIA support." Id. The memo further contained a notation directing that a copy be provided
to Vice-President Bush. Id. Evidence suggests that the plan was implemented. L.A. Times, Apr. 16,
1989, pt. I, at 1, col. 4 (describing release of aid to Honduras and Burghardt as probable special
emissary). The day after the verdict in the North trial, however, President Bush denied emphatically
that there had been a quid pro quo with Honduras. See N.Y. Times, May 5, 1989, at Al, col. 5. But
see Wallowing in Iran-Contra, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1989, § 4, at 26, col. 1 (editorial suggesting
that President's denial was not in fact categorical).
In a deposition in the trial of former National Security Adviser John Poindexter, President Reagan
answered "Yes" when asked, "if some aid and assistance is given to them [Honduras], you would
expect some aid and assistance back from them?" Deposition of Ronald W. Reagan at 109, United
States v. Poindexter (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 1990) (No. 88-0030); see also L.A. Times, Feb. 23, 1990, at
A22, col. 1 (describing Reagan's confirmation of Honduran quid pro quo).
14. Exhibit 54, supra note 11 (February 11, 1985 memo from North and Burghardt to McFar-
lane stating that "[flor obvious reasons, we would not wish to include this detail in any written
correspondence").
15. Exhibit 54, supra note 11; see also L.A. Times, Apr. 13, 1989, pt. 1, at 16, col. 1 (describing
memo).
16. Roberts, Prop for U.S. Policy: Secret Saudi Funds, N.Y. Times, June 21, 1987, at Al, col. 1
(operations in Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, the Sudan, Pakistan, Zaire, and Angola); see also Hoag-
land & Smith, "Coincidence of Objectives" Ties Saudis, U.S., Washington Post, Dec. 20, 1977, at
Al, col. I (describing Saudi foreign policy ventures taken at urging of U.S.); id. ("The Saudis clearly
see an implied quid pro quo ...."); Weiner, U.S. Used Secret Global Network to Ann Afghans,
Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 29, 1988, at Al, col. I ("The United States sold ...[Saudi Arabia,
China, Pakistan, Egypt, and Iran] billions of dollars in weapons and gave them tens of millions more,
to encourage their silent support.").
17. Z. BRZEZINSKI, POWER AND PRINCIPLE 450 (1983). At the same time, the U.S. increased aid
to Pakistan dramatically to secure its support for the Afghan insurgents. See TAHIR-KHELI, THE
UNITED STATES AND PAKISTAN: THE EVOLUTION OF AN INFLUENCE RELATIONSHIP 97-111
(1982); Bernstein, Arms for Afghanistan, NEW REPUBLIC, July 18, 1981, at 8.
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vide assistance to the Eastern European countries."8 These examples of
authorized foreign fundraising underscore the need to implement statutory
mechanisms encouraging Congress and the executive to reach agreements
on all forms of foreign fundraising activity.
Furthermore, without new controls, future administrations will con-
tinue to feel the temptation to engage in unauthorized forms of foreign
fundraising. The period since the end of the Vietnam War has been
marked by tensions between Congress and the executive over foreign assis-
tance, with Congress occasionally resorting to complete prohibitions on
aid. 9 In addition, Congress' reliance on appropriations controls is likely
to increase now that the Supreme Court has invalidated the legislative
veto,20 once a favorite means for Congress to exert its influence in the area
of foreign affairs. 2
B. Attempts at Legislative Control
Following the revelations in the North trial, Congress attempted to en-
act legislation to prevent future quid pro quo arrangements and solicita-
tions. In July, 1989, the Senate adopted what came to be known as the
Moynihan amendment as part of the State Department authorization bill,
criminalizing both quid pro quos and solicitations on behalf of foreign
causes or governments barred from receiving United States aid directly.22
18. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1989, § 1, at 19, col. 1 ("Prodded by the United States and other
Western democracies, Japan is moving cautiously toward approving a modest program of aid for
Poland."); N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1989, at A6, col. 1 ("President Bush has encouraged European
leaders to take the initiative in helping East European nations .... ").
19. See G. TREVERTON, COVERT ACTION: THE LiMrrs OF INTERVENTION IN THE POSTWAR
WORLD 145, 156-60, 256 (1987) (discussing appropriations cutoffs to Angola and Nicaragua); Fel-
ton, House Votes Authorization Bill in Show of Bipartisanship, 47 CONG. Q. 1641 (1989) (describing
congressional efforts to increase control over foreign aid). For Congress, an advantage of appropria-
tions restrictions is that they may be contained in bills that the President cannot afford to veto. Franck
& Bob, The Return of Humpty-Dumpty: Foreign Relations Law after the Chadha Case, 79 AN. J.
INT'L L. 912, 944 (1985).
20. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
21. See Franck & Bob, supra note 19, at 944 (controls on spending as replacement for legislative
veto); Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra
Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1301 & n.210 (1988) (legislative veto and appropriations control only
congressional tools with "bite" in foreign affairs). In a footnote in his opinion for the Court in
Chadha, Chief Justice Burger declared that "other means of control, such as durational limits on
authorizations and formal reporting requirements, lie well within Congress' constitutional power."
462 U.S. at 955 n.19.
22. 135 CONG. REC. S8110 (daily ed. July 18, 1989). The amendment got its name from its
principal sponsor, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. The relevant portion of the amendment stated
that:
Whenever any provision of United States law enacted on or after the date of enactment of the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1990, expressly prohibits all United States
assistance, or all assistance under a specified United States assistance account, from being pro-
vided to any specified foreign region, country, government, group, or individual, then-(A) no
officer or employee of the United States Government may solicit the provision of funds or
material assistance by any foreign government (including any instrumentality or agency
thereof), foreign person, or United States person, and (B) no United States assistance shall be
provided to any third party, if the provision of such funds or assistance would have the pur-
pose or direct effect of furthering or carrying out the same or similar activities, with respect to
1990] 2047
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The proposal defined quid pro quos broadly as the provision of funds
with the "purpose or direct effect" of inducing the recipient to aid the
barred cause or government.2" A conference committee diluted the mea-
sure so that it criminalized all quid pro quo arrangements and those solic-
itations where U.S. officials exercise direct control over funds donated,
and required the President to report to Congress regarding all other solici-
tations.24 In addition, the conference committee narrowed the definition of
quid pro quos by dropping the words "or direct effect."'25 President Bush
nevertheless vetoed the bill, citing "serious constitutional problems" and
"an unacceptable risk that it will chill the conduct of our Nation's foreign
affairs."26 At about the same time and for many of the same reasons,
President Bush vetoed a parallel provision, known as the Obey amend-
ment, contained in the foreign aid appropriations bill. The original
Obey amendment included no criminal sanctions and prohibited solicita-
tions and any expenditures of United States funds "for the purpose of
furthering any military or foreign policy activity which is contrary to
United States law."2 President Bush finally accepted a significantly
that region, country, government, group, or individual, for which United States assistance is
prohibited. . . . (b) Penalty.-Any person who violates the provision of subsection (a)(1)(A)
(relating to solicitation) shall be imprisoned not more than 5 years or fined in accordance with
title 18, United States Code, or both.
135 CONG. REC. S8027 (daily ed. July 17, 1989).
23. Id.
24. 135 CONG. REC. H8703 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1989) (House approval); 135 CONG. REC.
S15826 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1989) (Senate approval). The relevant portions of the bill stated that:
Whenever any provision of United States law expressly refers to this section and expressly
prohibits all United States assistance, or all assistance under a specified United States assis-
tance account, from being provided to any specified foreign region, country, government,
group, or individual for all or specified activities, then no officer or employee of the Executive
branch may-(A) receive, accept, hold, control, use, spend, disburse, distribute, or transfer any
funds or property from any foreign government (including any instrumentality or agency
thereof), foreign person, or United States person; (B) use any United States funds or facilities
to assist any transaction whereby a foreign government (including any instrumentality or
agency thereof), foreign person, or United States person provides any funds or property to any
third party; or (C) provide any United States assistance to any third party, if the purpose of
any such act is the furthering or carrying out of the same activities, with respect to that region,
country, government, group, or individual, for which United States assistance is expressly pro-
hibited. . . . (b) Penalty.-Any person who knowingly and willfully violates the provision of
subsection (a) (1) shall be imprisoned not more than 5 years or fined in accordance with title
18, United States Code, or both. (c) Presidential Notification.-(1) Whenever-(A) any provi-
sion of United States law described in subsection (a)(1) expressly refers to this section and
expressly prohibits the provision of United States assistance for specified recipients or activi-
ties, and (B) any officer or employee of the Executive branch advocates, promotes, or encour-
ages the provision of funds or property by any foreign government (including any instrumen-
tality or agency thereof), foreign person, or United States person for the purpose of furthering
or carrying out the same or similar activities with respect to such recipients, then the President
shall notify the Congress in a timely fashion that such advocacy, promotion, or encouragement
has occurred. Such notification may be submitted in classified form.
135 CONG. REc. H8313 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1989).
25. Id.
26. 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1806, 1806 (Nov. 21, 1989).
27. Id. at 1783 (Nov. 19, 1989). The amendment was named after its principal sponsor, Con-
gressman David Obey.
28. 135 CONG. REC. S15679 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1989).
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weaker version of the Obey amendment that prohibited only explicit quid
pro quo agreements, contained no criminal sanctions, and said nothing
about solicitations.2"
II. QUID PRO Quo ARRANGEMENTS
Congress is on firm ground when it relies on its power over appropria-
tions to regulate foreign fundraising in the form of quid pro quos. United
States v. Lovett is the only case in which the Supreme Court has ruled an
appropriations restriction unconstitutional." Although a broad reading of
Lovett indicates that Congress may not use the appropriations power to
encroach upon the powers of the other branches, the difficult question is
how expansively to read this limitation, since the appropriations power is
itself a textually explicit grant of power. This Note argues that a determi-
nation of the constitutionality of a prohibition on quid pro quo arrange-
ments requires balancing Congress' interest in controlling appropriations
against the resulting encroachment on the executive's foreign affairs pow-
ers. Given Congress' strong interest in appropriations, only a significant
encroachment would justify preventing Congress from regulating quid pro
quos.a '
29. Pub. L. No. 101-167, § 582 (1989). The provision stated that:
None of the funds appropriated by this Act may be provided any foreign government (includ-
ing any instrumentality or agency thereof), foreign person, or United States person in ex-
change for that foreign government or person undertaking any action which is, if carried out
by the United States Government, a United States official or employee, expressly prohibited by
a provision of United States law.
Id. President Bush would not even accept this language until Congressman Obey agreed to explain on
the floor of the House that "the word 'exchange' should be understood to refer to a direct verbal or
written agreement." 135 CONG. REC. H9231 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1989). In his signing statement,
President Bush reiterated that the act prohibits only "transactions in which U.S. funds are provided to
a foreign nation on the express condition that the foreign nation provide specific assistance to a third
country . ." 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRE. Doc. 1811 (Nov. 21, 1989).
30. 328 U.S. 303 (1946). The Court in Lovett held that a statute terminating the salaries of three
"subversive" executive branch employees was an unconstitutional bill of attainder. Id. at 313-15. The
Court implicitly rejected the argument of the counsel for Congress that the act "involved simply an
exercise of congressional powers over appropriations, which . . . are plenary and not subject to judi-
cial review." Id. at 306-07.
31. This Note essentially adopts the functionalist approach to separation of powers questions ar-
ticulated in several recent Supreme Court opinions. In Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988), the
Court held that although the Ethics in Government Act diminished the President's control over certain
types of criminal prosecution, it did not "unduly interfer[e] with the role of the Executive Branch," id.
at 2620, or "preventl] the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned func-
tions." Id. at 2621 (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)); see
aI'o Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 667 (1989) (Sentencing Commission does not "imper-
missibly interfere[] with the functioning of the Judiciary").
Professor Stith has adopted a similar approach to separation of powers questions involving Con-
gress' appropriations power:
[although Congress may not completely frustrate the exercise of the President's constitutional
duties, this is but a marginal circumscription of Congress' power over the purse and its other
legislative powers .... Congress retains significant constitutional power to constrain the Presi-
dent through appropriations limitations as long as these constraints do not prevent the Execu-
tive from fulfilling indispensable constitutional duties.
Stith, Congres,%' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1352 (1988). Professor Stith suggests, how-
ever, that these "constitutional duties" include only textually constitutional powers, id. at 1351,
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A. The Power of the Purse
Article I, section 9 of the Constitution states that "[n]o Money shall be
drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law. ... "2 Although the Constitution places the power of the purse in
the hands of Congress, the formulation of the budget is a shared process
requiring the participation of both Congress and the executive. The exec-
utive first proposes a budget to Congress and then negotiates with individ-
ual committees, relying on the threat of a presidential veto to gain some
leverage.3 3 Once appropriations are signed into law, the executive contin-
ues to play a key role; institutional limitations on Congress and deference
to executive expertise require that most appropriations be made in the
form of lump-sum grants, with considerable discretion given to executive
agencies to decide how the money should be spent. 4 In the case of foreign
assistance, the executive has generally been given significant control to de-
cide how much money each country will receive.35
The interactive nature of the budget process should not, however, ob-
scure Congress' power over appropriations. The appropriations clause in
the Constitution establishes the principle that all Federal expenditures
must be authorized, whether generally or specifically, by Congress.36 Con-
gress, through its appropriations power, controls the size and more impor-
tantly the purposes of government programs.3" Alexander Hamilton de-
scribed the extent of Congress' control, declaring that "no money can be
expended, but for an object, to an extent, and out of a fund, which the
laws have prescribed." '
Congress' use of the appropriations power to participate in foreign af-
fairs is supported by three sources of precedent: text, judicial decision, and
whereas this Note argues more broadly that they include powers acquired through judicial precedent
and practice.
32. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
33. For a general account of the budget process, see Schick, The Battle of the Budget, in CON-
GRESS AGAINST THE PRESIDENT 51 (H. Mansfield ed. 1975).
34. See L. FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 262 (1975).
35. See Meyer, Congressional Control of Foreign Assistance, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 69, 103 n.158
(1988). But see Felton, supra note 19, at 1643 (discussing increased use of earmarking by Congress to
control foreign aid).
36. See Stith, supra note 31, at 1351-53; see also Doe v. Mathews, 420 F. Supp. 865, 871
(D.N.J. 1976) ("no officer may pay an obligation of the United States without an appropriation for
that purpose. . . ."); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 2-9 (1982) ("no debt may be paid out of public funds, under any
circumstances, unless the Congress has made an appropriation for that purpose").
37. Stith, supra note 31, at 1352-56. Congress' power to direct the executive to expend funds for
specified purposes was established early on in Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12
Pet.) 524 (1838). In practice, Congress retains control over appropriations through a variety of tools,
including directives in committee reports, hearings, and floor debates; informal understandings
reached with agencies on how funds will be spent; and explicit conditions included in legislation
authorizing and appropriating funds. See L. FISHER, supra note 34, at 72-73.
38. Hamilton, Explanation, Daily Advertiser (New York, N.Y.), Nov. 20, 1795, supp. (emphasis
in original), reprinted in 19 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 400, 405 (H. Syrett ed. 1973).
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practice.3 9 The text of the Constitution nowhere limits Congress' power
over appropriations to domestic affairs, and explicitly assigns responsibil-
ity over foreign affairs to both Congress and the executive. The Constitu-
tion makes the President the commander in chief of the army and navy,
and gives him the power to appoint and receive ambassadors, as well as to
negotiate treaties.4 In addition to his enumerated powers, the President
enjoys those powers contained in the "executive Power" clause.41 The
Constitution explicitly grants Congress many more powers in foreign af-
fairs, including most prominently the power to declare war and to regu-
late foreign commerce.42 In addition, Congress is given a check over the
President's appointment and treaty powers through the requirement that
both be approved by the Senate.43
In dicta, courts have suggested that control over the purse is a source of
congressional power in foreign affairs. In a vacated opinion in Goldwater
v. Carter,44 a case concerning the President's right to terminate a treaty
without Senate consent, the D.C. Circuit declared that "[t]he legislature's
powers, including prominently its dominant status in the provision of
funds . . .establish authority for appropriate legislative participation in
foreign affairs."415 Although Congress has frequently relied on its power of
the purse to direct foreign affairs, only one lower court, in an opinion
later vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court for procedural reasons,
has found an appropriations measure unconstitutional on the grounds that
it interfered with the President's conduct of foreign affairs.4 6
39. See H. KOH, supra note 6, at 70 (describing vacated judicial decisions and practice as "quasi-
constitutional custom"); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (noting "his-
tory of [congressional] acquiescence in executive claims settlement"); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Deeply embedded traditional
ways of conducting government cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning
to the words of a text or supply them. It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitu-
tional law to confine it to words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written
upon them."); L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 93, 95, 99 (1972) (describing
foreign affairs powers established by practice); P. SHANE & H. BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL
POWER 507 (1988) (presidential power to recognize governments established by practice). But cf. INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (ruling unconstitutional long practice of legislative veto).
40. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cls. 1 & 2; id. at § 3.
41. Id. at cl. 1. The clause was intentionally left vague by the Founders. P. ShANE & H. BRUFF,
supra note 39, at 10-11.
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3 & 11.
43. Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
44. 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
45. Id. at 709; see also Dornan v. United States Secretary of Defense, 676 F. Supp. 6, 9 (D.D.C.
1987) (holding constitutionality of Boland amendments nonjusticiable, but noting that Congress' "ex-
plicit legislative power to appropriate" gives power in foreign affairs), affd, 851 F.2d 450 (1988).
46. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 671 (D.D.C. 1988), va-
cited a-% mout sub. nor. American Serv. Ass'n v. Garfinkel, 109 S. Ct. 1693 (1989) (per curiam).
The court struck down a statute that barred funds to implement or enforce nondisclosure agreements.
Id The Supreme Court has never held unconstitutional an appropriations control on foreign affairs.
See Franck & Bob, supra note 19, at 944 ("Despite frequent use of spending curbs to limit executive
discretion, the Supreme Court has never found the practice invalid."); Glennon, Strengthening the
War Powers Resolution: The Case for Purse-Strings Restrictions, 60 MINN. L. REv. 1, 29-30
(1975). Furthermore, at the same time as the District court ruling in National Federation, another
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Finally, although the result of practice has generally been to increase
dramatically the executive's power in foreign affairs, the reverse has been
true with respect to the appropriations power. The executive has long
acquiesced in a pattern of congressional participation in foreign affairs
through controls on appropriations." In particular, Congress has firmly
established its power to attach conditions to foreign aid."8
At present, Congress uses the appropriations process to influence for-
eign affairs by determining the budgets of the State Department and the
military, the size of contributions to international organizations, and the
extent of aid to foreign governments.49 Furthermore, Congress regularly
directs executive branch officials to implement particular foreign policies,
requires that certain conditions be met abroad before aid will be provided,
and exercises oversight over foreign programs."0 In 1987, the Senate
added 86 floor amendments to the State Department authorization bill, all
of which affected foreign policy issues.51 In recent years, Congress has
used its appropriations power to terminate military operations in Viet-
nam, Cambodia, Laos, Angola, and Nicaragua, and to reduce or terminate
aid to countries with poor records on human rights.52
The combination of text, judicial precedent, and practice creates a
District court stated that it was "aware of no case striking down federal legislation as an encroach-
ment of the executive's authority to conduct foreign affairs." Mendelsohn v. Meese, 690 F. Supp.
1226, 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that Anti-Terrorism Act, narrowly construed, does not violate
First Amendment).
47. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 2d Sess. 514 app. (1842) (statement of Rep. Linn) (as means of
controlling "foreign intercourse, ...from the origin of the Government to the present time, this
House has exercised the power . . . of either confining the appropriations within the limits of its own
judgment and discretion, or of withholding them"); Nobleman, Financial Aspects of Congressional
Participation in Foreign Relations, 289 ANNALS 145 (1953) (describing Congress' use of appropria-
tions power to affect foreign affairs from founding until 1953); Glennon, supra note 46, at 13-23
(describing congressional moves to end Vietnam war through funding prohibitions).
In a signing statement of the 1990-91 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, President Bush stated
that he would ignore a number of conditions on foreign relations which he considered unconstitu-
tional, including a restriction on negotiating with the Palestine Liberation Organization. 26 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 266 (Feb. 16, 1990). A senior official suggested that the administration might
challenge the provisions in court. Washington Post, Feb. 17, 1990, at A23, col. 4.
48. See Meyer, supra note 35, at 72-88 (describing evolution of congressional control over foreign
aid); id. at 89 ("Congress retains ample constitutional authority to control foreign assistance"); see
also L. HENKIN, supra note 39, at 110 ("Foreign assistance seems not merely an appropriation of
funds to implement policies which are primarily the President's responsibility but a form of spending
for the general welfare of the United States, and it is difficult to accept that the President should
command a power expressly conferred upon Congress.").
49. See L. HENKIN, supra note 39, at 79.
50. See C. CRABB & P. HOLT, INVITATION TO STRUGGLE: CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND
FOREIGN POLIcY 41 (1980).
51. See P. SHANE & H. BRUFF, supra note 39, at 518. The amendments accomplished, among
other things, the cancellation of two U.S.-Soviet embassy site agreements and the imposition of travel
restrictions on Communist diplomats. Id.; see also Fessler & Felton, Senators Use Bill as a Forum
for Foreign Policy Views, 47 CONG. Q. 1879 (1989) ("In what has become a biannual rite, the Senate
loaded routine State Department legislation with almost a hundred amendments to steer the nation's
foreign policies before passing the bill early July 21.").
52. Broder & Lambek, Military Aid to Guatemala: The Failure of U.S. Human Rights Legisla-
tion, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 111, 132 (1988); Koh, supra note 21, at 1267-68.
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strong presumption in favor of the constitutionality of congressional uses
of the appropriations power to affect foreign affairs.53
B. The Problem with Quid Pro Quos
Executive branch opponents of the recent proposals to regulate foreign
fundraising conceded that Congress' power over the purse entails some
power to prohibit quid pro quo arrangements.54 President Bush, however,
would only accept a limited ban on explicit quid pro quos, arguing that a
broader prohibition "threaten[ed] to subject to criminal investigation a
wide range of entirely legitimate diplomatic activity . . . . [t]he result [of
which] would be a dangerous timidity and disarray in the conduct of U.S.
foreign policy."5 Such a ban, President Bush suggested, would unconsti-
tutionally burden the executive's foreign affairs powers.
Quid pro quos, however, threaten to render Congress' power over the
purse meaningless.56 Such arrangements eliminate the ability of Congress
to determine how U.S. funds are spent by allowing the executive to use
appropriated funds indirectly for purposes explicitly denied funding by
Congress. A ban on quid pro quos represents only a further attempt by
Congress to control appropriated funds, and therefore Congress stands at
the peak of its power when it enacts such a measure.
The Iran-Contra affair indicates, moreover, that only a broad prohibi-
tion on quid pro quos would effectively protect Congress' power over the
purse. The evidence suggests that quid pro quo arrangements are rarely
the result of explicit agreements. In the case of Honduras, for example,
conditions on aid were communicated orally by a special envoy, and Mc-
Farlane later advised President Reagan to remind President Suazo of the
arrangement "[w]ithout making the linkage too explicit."157 Even with re-
spect to Saudi aid to the rebels in Afghanistan, an arrangement tacitly
authorized by Congress, a former State Department official explained that
the quid pro quo was "implicit, but . . . unambiguous. The Saudis see
53. See, e.g., Franck & Bob, supra note 19, at 944 ("In seeking to co-determine U.S. foreign
policy, Congress is on firmest constitutional ground when it deploys its undoubted discretion over
government spending.").
54. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. S8035 (daily ed. July 17, 1989) (letter from administration oppos-
ing Moynihan amendment conceding that "[w]here Congress has prohibited aid to a particular coun-
try, we do not dispute that it can prevent circumvention of that prohibition by prohibiting the United
States from providing money to a third country to be passed along to the prohibited country").
55. 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1806, 1806 (Nov. 21, 1989) (veto of Moynihan amendment).
Representative Edwards, defending the administration's position, explained that "[p]eople who are
going about their business representing this country in dealings with other nations do not want to
have to live in fear that their every action is going to be misinterpreted." 135 CONG. REC. H9089
(daily ed. Nov. 20, 1989).
56. In February, 1985, while the administration was publicly trying to persuade Congress to
release S14 million in aid for the Contras, it successfully solicited $24 million from the Saudis. IRAN-
CONTRA REPORT, supra note 1, at 45. This example suggests that the executive could use quid pro
quos to replace funds denied by Congress.
57. Exhibit 54, supra note 11.
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this as a special relationship and we do, too.""8 Limiting Congress to a
narrow ban on explicit quid pro quos would, therefore, disable Congress
from exercising effective control over the uses to which U.S. funds are put.
This conclusion suggests that only a significant encroachment on the exec-
utive's foreign affairs powers could justify restricting the scope of a con-
gressional ban on quid pro quos as a constitutional matter. But even while
conceding that the executive has acquired expansive independent powers
over the conduct of diplomacy, there is no evidence that a broad ban on
quid pro quos-aimed at implicit and explicit agreements and imposing
criminal penalties for violations-would "unduly interfere[]" 9 with the
executive's powers.
The Iran-Contra affair demonstrates that quid pro quo arrangements
aimed at circumventing a congressional prohibition on aid are not within
the scope of normal diplomatic activity, and that therefore a broad prohi-
bition would not affect ordinary diplomatic conduct. First, the evidence
suggests that such quid pro quos will be pursued only after high-level
deliberation and approval. In the case of Honduras, even though the exec-
utive had already endorsed a general policy of raising funds for the Con-
tras from third countries, the specific arrangement with Honduras was
implemented only after consultation with Cabinet officials and approval
by the President. Since few countries want to antagonize Congress, gov-
ernments will agree to a quid pro quo arrangement only if assured in
secret that the plan has at least been approved by senior executive branch
officials."0 Furthermore, the Honduran documents suggest that because
the executive was acting contrary to congressional policy, it sought to keep
the quid pro quo arrangement separate from normal diplomatic activity.
Oliver North successfully limited the role of the U.S. ambassador to Hon-
duras out of a fear that the ambassador might "be queried [by Congress]
on whether or not such overtures were made to the Hondurans."' In-
stead, North insisted on sticking with the plan endorsed by the President
which was to rely on a special envoy to communicate the conditions to
Honduras.62 The Honduras example suggests that quid pro quos imple-
mented in contravention of congressional policy will be the result only of
secret, compartmentalized, and extraordinary diplomatic activity. This
conclusion indicates that a ban aimed at such activity should not be
deemed unconstitutional on its face, but only if applied to constrain nor-
mal diplomatic relations.
58. Roberts, supra note 16, at A10, col. 1 (quoting Alfred L. Atherton, former Assistant Secretary
of State for the Middle East).
59. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2620 (1988).
60. McFarlane testified at the North trial that disclosure of the Honduras quid pro quo would
have been "embarrassing" to the Honduran government. Washington Post, Mar. 16, 1989, at Al, col.
1.
61. Exhibit 54, supra note 11.
62. Id.
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A broad ban on quid pro quos would, furthermore, not affect diplo-
matic activity more than other appropriations measures to which the exec-
utive has acquiesced. Funding conditions that direct the State Department
to pursue specified policies, aid cut-offs, changes in the military budget,
conditions requiring recipients of aid to meet certain human rights stan-
dards, and congressional oversight over the foreign policy process all have
profound effects on the conduct of diplomacy. A termination of aid to a
particular country for human rights abuses, a power unquestionably
within Congress' domain, will have drastic effects on diplomatic relations
with that country.63 In fact, it is clear that the executive always conducts
diplomacy against the background of policies implemented by Congress.
The Iran-Contra quid pro quos were, for example, themselves only pur-
sued in reaction to an appropriations measure: the termination of all
United States assistance to the Nicaraguan Contras. The effect on diplo-
macy of a quid pro quo ban could hardly be as far-reaching as these
measures.
The experience of the Iran-Contra affair, together with an analysis of
Congress' use of the appropriations power to influence foreign affairs,
suggests that Congress has the power to enact a broad prohibition on quid
pro quo agreements. The effect of such a ban on the executive's conduct of
normal diplomatic relations would be minimal, and is amply justified by
Congress' interest in preserving its power over the purse.
III. SOLICITATIONS
A prohibition on foreign solicitations presents dramatically different
separation of powers questions from those presented by a ban on quid pro
quo agreements. As with quid pro quos, the difficult question is not so
much whether Congress may regulate solicitations, but how broadly it
may do so.
A. The Executive Branch Claims
In the case of solicitations, the strength of the competing claims are
reversed; here, the executive has the stronger argument against a weaker
claim by Congress. A powerful case for executive control over diplomatic
communications, meaning specifically negotiations with foreign govern-
ments, can be made based on text, judicial precedent, and practice without
resorting to broad claims of executive control over foreign affairs
generally.
The text of the Constitution is, once again, hardly clear. It grants the
63. See Broder & Lambek, supra note 52, at 132 n.117 (Guatemala curtails relations after
human rights criticisms). While Congress debated legislation containing sanctions on China, Chinese
officials warned that if the measures were implemented, relations between the two countries would be
seriously harmed. Washington Post, Nov. 20, 1989, at A26, col. 1.
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executive the "Power . . . to make Treaties," but only with the "Advice
and Consent of the Senate,"' "4 suggesting that treaties are to be negotiated
and ratified cooperatively, with the executive and Congress each playing a
role throughout the process.65 More importantly, the Constitution grants
the President the power to receive66 and appoin 6 7 ambassadors, sug-
gesting further presidential power over negotiations.
Proponents of broad executive powers in foreign affairs have relied less
on constitutional text than on expansive judicial precedent and established
practice.6 8 The principal Court case is United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., in which Justice Sutherland declared broadly that the Pres-
ident "is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations."69 Critics of
Curtiss-Wright have pointed out that the expansive language was dicta,
since the case involved not independent executive powers but rather au-
thority granted by Congress."0 Even a narrow reading of Curtiss-Wright,
however, leaves substantial independent control to the executive over dip-
lomatic communications. Justice Sutherland stated that
In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate
and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak
or listen as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the
advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the
field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is
powerless to invade it.7 1
The Court has consistently reaffirmed the executive's power over diplo-
matic relations with foreign nations. One year after Curtiss-Wright, the
Court held that the President has the authority to recognize governments,
establish diplomatic relations, and negotiate executive agreements based
on his "authority to speak as the sole organ of that government."' 72 In
Dames & Moore v. Regan, the Court reiterated the President's control
over foreign relations, arguing that the executive has a degree of indepen-
64. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
65. H. KoI, supra note 6, at 41.
66. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 1.
67. Id. at § 2, cl. 2.
68. Koh, supra note 21, at 1306.
69. 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (quoting Rep. John Marshall, 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800)).
70. See, e.g., H. KOH, supra note 6, at 135 (advocating shared participation in foreign affairs
based on Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown); Glennon, Two Views of Presidential Foreign
Affairs Power: Little v. Barreme or Curtiss-Wright?, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 5, 11 (1988) (offering
alternative vision based on Little v. Barreme).
71. 299 U.S. at 319 (emphasis in text); see also E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND
POWERS, 1787-1984, at 208 (5th ed. 1984) (arguing that President is "sole instrument of communica-
tion" in foreign affairs); L. HENKIN, supra note 39, at 45 ("Even narrowly conceived, 'sole organ'
implies legal authority in the President and legal limitations on others in that only he (not, notably,
Congress) may communicate with foreign governments.").
72. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937).
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dent authority over "executive agreements" and over "normalizing United
States' relations with a foreign state."7
Perhaps the strongest support for executive control over foreign commu-
nications, however, derives from practice. Congress has never seriously
challenged the executive's control over foreign communications.74 As Pro-
fessor Louis Henkin has written, the Constitution's "[t]ext, context, de-
sign, intent and history" provide the President with "sole and exclusive
authority over diplomacy and the diplomatic process, the recognition of
states and governments, the maintenance of diplomatic relations, [and] the
conduct of negotiations." 5
Encroachment on the executive's control over foreign relations is a con-
cern with respect to prohibitions on both quid pro quo arrangements and
solicitations. The difference, however, is that in the context of solicitations,
the executive is engaged only in communication with foreign governments,
and not the disbursement of funds. Congress, therefore, has a weaker
claim to regulate solicitations. A prohibition on solitications would, fur-
thermore, have a more intrusive effect on the executive's control over
diplomacy.
B. Congress' Claims and the Problem of Solicitations
The separation of powers calculus changes with respect to a ban on
solicitations primarily because Congress can no longer claim to be acting
pursuant to its appropriations power.76 When an executive branch official
solicits funds from a foreign government to be donated directly to a third
party, no United States funds are involved. A prohibition on solicitations
cannot be characterized, therefore, as an attempt to control the uses to
which United States funds are put, as in the case of controls on quid pro
quo arrangements.
Congress must, therefore, rely on other sources of constitutional power
to justify a control on solicitations. In addition to granting Congress a role
with respect to the negotiation and ratification of treaties, the Constitution
also grants Congress the power to regulate foreign commerce and the
power to declare war, two important foreign affairs powers.7 7 When Con-
gress acts pursuant to these powers, however, it is no longer at the peak of
73. 453 U.S. 654, 682-83 (1981).
74. See L. HENKIN, supra note 39, at 93.
75. L. HENKIN, CONSTITUrIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 48 (1990), quoted
in H. KOH, supra note 6, at 260 n.8; see also H. KOH, supra note 6, at 69 (describing "limited realm
of exclusive [executive] powers, with regard to diplomatic relations and negotiations and to the recog-
nition of nations and governments").
76. It is true that appropriations are required to pay the salaries of executive branch officials, but
this seems to be merely a trivial exercise of that power. Furthermore, it does not escape the question
considered below of whether solicitations can be prohibited without interfering with the executive's
foreign affairs power.
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3 & 11.
1990] 2057
The Yale Law Journal
its power. Congress' specific grants of foreign affairs powers have been
construed narrowly by Congress and the courts, and they have been lim-
ited by the executive's exclusive control over foreign relations and
communications.78
The separation of powers balance changes, moreover, because a ban on
solicitations would likely invade the executive's control over diplomacy to
a far greater degree than would a quid pro quo prohibition. Defining
what constitutes encouragement is more difficult than defining a quid pro
quo, which involves giving U.S. aid in return for assistance to another
government. Furthermore, any effort to define the sorts of encouragements
that are prohibited would render the statute ineffective, since executive
officials could simply use alternative language to make their meaning
clear."9 Thus, in order to be meaningful, a ban on solicitations would have
to prohibit nearly all discussions with other governments of the country or
cause barred from receiving U.S. aid. Such a prohibition would certainly
have a broad chilling effect on the conduct of diplomacy, and might even
raise First Amendment concerns."0
The executive's power over foreign communications, Congress' weak
claim to regulate solicitations, and the more intrusive effect of a solicita-
tions ban suggest that such an act would violate the constitutional princi-
ple of separation of powers."1
78. See generally H. KOH, supra note 6, at 117-49.
79. During the Iran-Contra hearings, former National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane testi-
fied that he interpreted the Boland amendments as prohibiting solicitations, but that he nevertheless
thought it was permissible to tell an ambassador "of the plight of the Contras and hope[] for a contri-
bution." IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 1, at 45. This testimony suggests that executive officials
would find ways around anything but the broadest ban on solicitations.
80. Two lines of cases would be relevant to such an inquiry. One holds that a government worker
may not be prevented from commenting on "matters of public concern." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 142 (1983) (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). Thus, even if
Congress could prohibit employees from soliciting in their official capacities, it could not bar them
from publicly expressing the view that every country in the world should help a particular foreign
cause.
A second line suggests that Congress may insist that no funds-for office supplies, phones, or
travel-be used to solicit funds. In Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S.
540 (1963), the Court ruled that the government may refuse to subsidize speech with "public mon-
eys." Id. at 545. The scope of this ruling is, however, unclear since the Court stated that Congress
may not "discriminate invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to 'ai[m] at the suppression of
dangerous ideas.'" Id. at 548 (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (quot-
ing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958))). Compare Massachusetts v. Secretary of HHS,
No. 88-1279, slip op. at 68-71 (Ist Cir. Mar. 19, 1990) (relying on Regan language to strike down
regulations prohibiting doctors from using funds to offer abortion counseling) with New York v. Sulli-
van, 889 F.2d 401, 412-14 (2d Cir. 1989) (upholding regulations).
81. Given this conclusion, it is not surprising that Congress dropped the solicitations ban from the
Moynihan amendment. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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IV. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL: BAN ON QUID PRO QUOS AND
REPORTING
This Section proposes a three-part statute to enable Congress to assert
control over foreign fundraising. First, the act should, in an introductory
section, define the constitutional differences between quid pro quos and
solicitations. Second, whenever Congress bars funds to a foreign govern-
ment or cause, the act should broadly criminalize quid pro quos aimed at
providing aid to the barred recipient. Finally, the act should require the
executive to report all efforts to solicit funds on behalf of any cause or
government barred from receiving U.S. aid directly. 2
A. General Goals
The specific elements of a reporting requirement could take different
forms, but any version should seek to accomplish two broad goals: The
proposal should provide Congress with the tools necessary to control quid
pro quos and solicitations to the extent allowed under the Constitution,
and it should provide a process for the executive and Congress to reach
compromises on questions of foreign fundraising.
Congress would achieve control through both the prohibition and the
reporting. The ban on quid pro quos would ensure that the executive
could not circumvent a decision by Congress to terminate funding to a
foreign cause or government by rewarding other governments for provid-
ing aid. Although Congress could not, consistent with the Constitution,
prohibit solicitations, the reporting requirement would provide Congress
with the information it needs to control solicitations indirectly. For exam-
ple, if the executive branch reported that it was urging a particular coun-
try to fund a foreign cause, Congress could then take steps to discourage
that country from providing the funding (through persuasion, reductions
in aid, etc.).8" Evidence from the Iran-Contra affair suggests that foreign
governments will be discouraged from responding to solicitations if Con-
gress is informed and disapproves.8 Thus, even if the result of a prohibi-
tion on quid pro quo arrangements were that the executive relied more on
solicitations, the reporting requirement would permit Congress to *exercise
some measure of control over the administration's fundraising activities.85
82. This proposal is an elaboration of the conference committee version of the Moynihan amend-
ment. See upra note 24 and accompanying text. Although President Bush vetoed the bill in part on
constitutional grounds, the analysis of this Note suggests that all parts of the proposal were
constitutional.
83. Congress has at times enacted statutes designed to discourage governments from providing aid
to other governments. In 1963, for example, Congress barred assistance to any country aiding Cuba.
Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, § 301(e), Pub. L. No. 88-205, 77 Stat. 379, 386.
84. FitzGerald, Annals ofJustice: Iran-Contra, NEw YORKER, Oct. 16, 1989, at 72 (El Salvador
declined to provide aid out of fear that Congress would learn and disapprove).
85. The reporting requirement is consistent with the view of the minority report of the Iran-
Contra committee that the President should conduct policies openly, unless secrecy is truly justified.
19901 2059
The Yale Law Journal
The control function of the reporting requirement presupposes, how-
ever, that Congress and the executive have reached an impasse on the
underlying funding question. In reality, funding issues are often far more
fluid, as demonstrated by the variations in funding to the Contras. When
Congress and the executive disagree on whether to provide support, the
extent of the disagreement will often change over time, and the two
branches will look for ways to compromise.86 Only when Congress and
the executive reach an impasse, as they did on several occasions over Con-
tra funding, will each branch wish to assert its respective powers over
quid pro quos and solicitations.
A reporting requirement should, therefore, not only provide the tools to
control foreign fundraising, but should also seek to establish a process for
the two branches to achieve compromises. The reporting requirement
should, in other words, attempt to bring questions of quid pro quo ar-
rangements and solicitations into the normal appropriations process.
B. Specific Elements of the Proposal
To be effective, a ban on quid pro quos should not be limited to explicit
agreements. Instead, the provision should follow the approach of the con-
ference committee version of the Moynihan amendment, which would
have broadly prohibited rewarding foreign governments for providing as-
sistance to barred governments or causes." In order to be meaningful, this
prohibition should be enforced by criminal penalties.
The reporting requirement should expand on the provision contained in
the conference committee version of the Moynihan amendment by obligat-
ing the executive to provide three different kinds of notification to Con-
gress. First, as a further means of enforcing the quid pro quo ban, the
statute should require high executive branch officials to inform Congress
of any quid pro quos pursued by their subordinates in violation of the
statute.88 Second, the President should be required to submit an annual
report to Congress simultaneously with the budget detailing which coun-
tries are providing aid to foreign governments or causes barred from re-
"The requirement for building long term political support means that the Administration would have
been better off if it had conducted its activities in the open. . .. [Ilt was politically foolish and
counterproductive to mislead Congress .... ." IRAN-CONTRA REPORT, supra note 1, at 515 (minor-
ity report).
86. With respect to the Contras, Congress reached a variety of compromises with the executive on
how much funding, what kind of funding, and what kinds of conditions to attach to the funding. See
supra note 3.
87. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
88. This requirement would be analogous to the provision in the 1980 Intelligence Oversight Act
requiring the Director of Central Intelligence to notify the intelligence committees of any "illegal
intelligence activity." Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, 50 U.S.C. § 413(a)(3) (1982). These provi-
sions are designed to impose an affirmative duty on executive branch officials to report information
about acts of wrongdoing.
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ceiving U.S. aid. 9 Finally, the statute should require prior notice
throughout the year of any specific decisions to solicit funds.9"
Congress is on strong constitutional grounds when it enacts reporting
requirements such as those above.9 1 In order to perform its constitutional
function of appropriating funds for foreign aid in a meaningful way, Con-
gress must be fully informed about the executive's efforts to raise funds
from abroad.
C. How the Proposal will Work
The reporting requirements described above are designed to encourage
dialogue and compromise at each stage of the appropriations process.
Whenever Congress enacts a prohibition on aid to a foreign government
or cause, the ban on quid pro quos and the various reporting require-
ments would be triggered. At that point and throughout the year, the ex-
ecutive would be required to notify Congress of any plans to solicit funds.
Once notified, the appropriations committees could respond by holding an
open or closed hearing to permit the administration to explain and justify
its plans. If the committees did not object, they could formally or infor-
mally endorse the proposal, or could encourage the administration to re-
strict the purposes of the solicitations by endorsing the administration's
plans only in part.92 If, however, the committees were opposed to the pro-
posal, they could initiate steps to discourage the solicitations by withhold-
ing funds from the executive for other projects, reducing future aid to the
89. This annual report would be similar to the report by the State Department submitted each
year to Congress describing the human rights practices of all potential recipients of United States aid.
International Security Assistance and Arms Export Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1988).
90. Aside from the insistence on prior notice, this provision is similar to the requirement that the
executive inform the intelligence committees of all covert operations. Intelligence Oversight Act of
1980, 50 U.S.C. § 413(a) (1982).
91. President Bush has argued on a number of occasions that reporting requirements could un-
constitutionally burden the executive's conduct of foreign affairs. See 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1806, 1807 (Nov. 21, 1989) (veto message of conference committee version of Moynihan amendment)
("Presidential notification procedures . . . also appear designed . . . to disable the President in the
conduct of foreign relations."); 26 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 266, 267 (Feb. 16, 1990) (signing
statement of 1990-91 Foreign Relations Authorization Act) ("blanket reporting requirements . . .
may . . .compromise my constitutional duty over . . . negotiations").
These broad claims are not, however, supported by the Constitution or by practice. In order to
perform its legislative function, Congress requires significant access to information, and the executive
has consistently acquiesced to such demands. See T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY
CONGRESS 83-114 (1979) (describing past and present pattern of congressional oversight); L. HEN-
KIN, supra note 39, at 87 ("[tjhe power of Congress to investigate is implied in its power to legis-
late"); H. KOH, supra note 6, at 171-73, 175-76 (Congress' constitutional claim to information); id.
at 39 & n.4 (pattern of executive compliance with reporting requirement of War Powers Resolution);
Franck & Bob, supra note 19, at 940 ("Congress, by legislation, can mandate consultation with all, or
designated, members of Congress before the President implements a new policy or takes a designated
action."); H.R. Doc. No. 171, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973) (President Nixon's veto message of War
Powers Resolution describing consultation procedures with Congress as constructive).
92. The Boland amendment in effect in 1986, for example, explicitly allowed the administration
to solicit humanitarian funds from abroad for the Contras. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-169, § 105, 99 Stat. 1002 (1985).
The Yale Law Journal
solicited country, or refusing to appropriate previously authorized aid to
the solicited country. At that point, it would be in the interest of both
Congress and the executive to reach an agreement on what sorts of solici-
tations are permissible.
When Congress considered whether to continue the prohibition on aid
the following year, the annual report would allow it to evaluate any new
requests from the administration for aid for the barred government or
cause. 3 In addition, Congress could consider steps to discourage or control
solicitations, and could initiate a dialogue with the executive regarding
foreign fundraising.
V. CONCLUSION
The requirement that the executive notify Congress of all covert activi-
ties provides a model for reporting in the area of solicitations and quid
pro quos. Although the intelligence committees do not have the statutory
power to disapprove covert activity plans, Congress can take steps, such as
cutting off funds, to end a covert operation. As a result, the notification
process has generally provided a means for Congress and the executive to
reach agreements on which projects to pursue.94 Similarly, although Con-
gress lacks the constitutional authority to prohibit solicitations, it could,
once notified, move to discourage them. As in the context of covert activi-
ties, therefore, a reporting requirement should encourage both branches to
reach compromises. Experience has also shown, of course, that reporting
provisions may be thwarted by the executive,9" but in these cases, the leg-
islation passed by Congress will at least clearly delineate the authority of
the two branches over quid pro quo arrangements and solicitations.
93. During the debates on Contra aid, Congress was not told that the Contras were receiving
millions of dollars from foreign governments at the behest of the administration.
94. See T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, supra note 91, at 125-29 (describing cooperative relation-
ship between executive and intelligence committees); N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1989, at A10, col. 1 (covert
operation proposals against Panama dropped after intelligence committees expressed disapproval). But
see H. KOH, supra note 6, at 59 (discussing problem of "capture" of congressional committees).
95. See Franck & Bob, supra note 19, at 940-41.
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